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Right to an Explanation Considered Harmful 
 
Andy Crabtree [1] · Lachlan Urquhart [2] · Jiahong Chen [3]
Abstract 
Lay and professional reasoning has it that newly 
introduced data protection regulation in Europe – 
GDPR – mandates a ‘right to an explanation’. This 
has been read as requiring that the machine 
learning (ML) community build ‘explainable 
machines’ to enable legal compliance. In reviewing 
relevant accountability requirements of GDPR and 
measures developed within the ML community to 
enable human interpretation of ML models, we 
argue that this reading should be considered 
harmful as it creates unrealistic expectations for the 
ML community and society at large. GDPR does not 
require that machines provide explanations, but that 
data controllers – i.e., human beings – do. We 
consider the implications of this requirement for the 
‘explainable machines’ agenda. 
1. Introduction 
“ … the paucity of critical writing in the machine learning 
community is problematic … as machine learning continues 
to exert influence upon society, we must be sure that we are 
solving the right problems … Thus, we believe that such 
critical writing ought to have a voice at machine learning 
conferences.” (Lipton, 2016) 
The title of this paper reflects a longstanding tradition in 
computer science initiated by Edsger Dijkstra in 1968 who 
wrote ‘Go To Statement Considered Harmful’, a critique of 
existing programming practices that eventually led the 
programming community to adopt structured programming 
(Dijkstra, 1968). Since then, titles that include the phrase 
‘considered harmful’ signal a critical essay that advocates 
change. In this case the change in question concerns treating 
GDPR as mandating a ‘right to an explanation’, that might be 
met through the ongoing development of machine learning 
(ML) methods of interpretability, as problematic and indeed 
harmful to the ML community and society at large.  
 
A cursory search of the Internet using the terms ‘GDPR right 
to explanation’ reveals that lay and professional reasoning 
widely read that new data protection regulation in Europe 
mandates a right to an explanation when their data is 
processed by algorithmic machines. Given GDPR’s 
territorial scope (see Article 3 GDPR, 2018), this right is 
effectively read as being globally applicable insofar as 
automated decision-making touches EU citizens or their data 
wherever it or they may reside. This reading has been seen by 
many commentators, practitioners and scholars to mean that 
we need to develop ‘explainable machines’ that can account 
for algorithmic decision-making. Taglines such as the 
following are not uncommon and feed the hype about the 
implications of GDPR for AI and machine learning. 
AI Will Have to Explain Itself 
The need for Explainable AI is being driven by upcoming 
regulations, like the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires 
explanations for decisions … Under the GDPR, there are 
hefty penalties for inaccurate explanations – making it 
imperative that companies correctly explain the 
decisioning process of its AI and ML systems, every time. 
(Zoldi, 2018) 
The perceived requirements of GDPR appear to segue neatly 
on the face of it with the ML community, which has been 
trying to find ways to render complex machine learning 
models ‘interpretable’ for over thirty years. Naturally we 
think this a laudable aim, for regardless of legal requirements 
people still have need to understand the machines they build 
and use. However, we are not convinced that ML methods of 
interpretability will meet the requirements of GDPR. Indeed, 
we argue that the perceived alignment between 
interpretability in ML and legal explanation should be 
considered harmful, insofar as it creates unrealistic 
expectations of what the ML community can deliver and what 
society at large can expect from algorithmic machines.  
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In what follows we explicate the grounds of our assertion in 
considering relevant accountability requirements of GDPR, 
particularly that it is the ‘data controller’, i.e., the party who 
determines the means and purposes of data processing, who 
is legally obligated to provide an explanation, not a machine 
and certainly not an algorithm. We also consider the kinds of 
explanation enabled by ML methods of interpretability and 
their resonance or ‘fit’ with salient accountability require-
ments of GDPR. We conclude in considering what is required 
of an explanation by GDPR and the societal imperative 
occasioned by the widespread introduction of inscrutable, 
non-intuitive algorithmic machines into everyday life. 
2. The Right to an Explanation? 
The accountability requirements of GDPR oblige data 
controllers to put in place effective policies and mechanisms 
to demonstrate that the processing of personal data is in 
compliance with GDPR (Urquhart et al., 2018). In this 
respect GDPR (2018) mandates in Article 13 (information to 
be provided when data are collected from the data subject), 
Article 14 (information to be provided when data have not 
been obtained from the data subject), and Article 15 (right of 
access by the data subject) that certain information must be 
provided to the data subject. This includes “the existence of 
automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to 
in Article 22 … and meaningful information about the logic 
involved … the significance and the envisaged consequences 
of such processing for the data subject (ibid.).” Article 22 
(automated individual decision-making, including profiling) 
mandates the conditions under which automated-decision 
making may take place. 
 
The “meaningful information” clause has led many 
commentators, practitioners and scholars to conclude that 
GDPR therefore mandates a right to an explanation with 
respect to the decisions made by algorithmic machines. While 
some contest the idea (see Wachter et al. 2017), our concern 
is that the nature of the explanation required by GDPR is 
commonly misunderstood and that this misunderstanding is 
harmful to the machine learning community and society at 
large insofar as it creates unrealistic expectations for both 
parties. Legal-tech scholars Edwards and Veale (2017) hint 
at the nature of the misunderstanding in accrediting it to a 
short paper written by Goodman and Flaxman (2016), who 
interpret the meaningful information clause as a 
“requirement [that] prompts the question: what does it mean, 
and what is required, to explain an algorithm’s decision?” 
 
Now when we look at GDPR for what it may say about what 
it means to explain an algorithm’s decision we find as others 
have found (e.g., Wachter et al., 2017; Selbst and Powles, 
2017; Edwards and Veale, 2017; Floridi et al., 2017) that 
there is no mention of explanation in any Article – and only 
Articles create legally binding obligations – but let us set that 
aside for the moment. What we do find, as stated above, is a 
requirement that the ‘data subject’ – i.e., the person whose 
data is to be, is being or has been processed – be informed of 
the logic involved in automated processing, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such 
processing. So at the outset the meaningful information 
required is not information, per Goodman and Flaxman 
(2016), that explains an algorithm’s decision but rather, as 
Selbst and Barocas (2018) put it, “a functional description of 
the model [or] the rules governing decision-making”. 
 
Furthermore, this functional description of the model or rules 
governing decision-making, which should be written in 
“clear and plain language” (Recital 39 GDPR, 2018), is 
prospective in nature and applies to all potential cases of 
automated decision-making, not just the particular case to 
hand. “The most important aspect of this type of explanation 
is that it is concerned with the operation of the model in 
general, rather than as it pertains to a particular outcome 
(Selbst and Barocas, 2018).” So whatever an explanation 
might amount to as mandated by Articles 13 and 14 it has 
nothing to do with explaining an algorithm’s decision.  
 
Rather, in the case of Article 13 explanation is about 
providing ex ante information that allows the data subject to 
make an informed choice as to whether or not they wish to 
engage in and subject their data to the kind of automated 
decision-making offered by the data controller when entering 
into a contract or consenting to such processing. In the case 
of Article 14, explanation is about providing sufficient 
information to allow the data subject to “vindicate her other 
substantive rights under the GDPR and human rights law” 
(ibid.), including the right to obtain from the controller 
confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning 
him or her are being processed and, if they are, to exercise 
their right of access and request from the controller 
rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of 
processing of personal data or to object to such processing, 
as per Article 15. 
 
As Edwards and Veale (2017) note in referring to the right of 
access, Article 15 implies that data has been collected and 
processing has begun or taken place. It therefore appears to 
promise a right to an explanation ex post and that “tailored 
knowledge about specific decisions” (ibid.) should be 
provided to the data subject. Article 15 thus appears to speak 
to the kind of explanation invoked by Goodman and 
Flaxman. However, as Edwards and Veale observe, Article 
15 “has a carve out in the recitals, for the protection of trade 
secrets and IP.” Thus Recital 63 (GDPR, 2018) states that 
the right of access “should not adversely affect the rights or 
freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual 
property and in particular the copyright protecting the 
software.” So it would appear that the right to an explanation 
as construed by Goodman and Flaxman exists, but is limited. 
 
However, that would be to concede too much. As noted 
above, there is no mention of a right to an explanation in any 
Article within GDPR. Where we do find mention of it is in 
the Recitals, which support interpretation of an Article’s 
meaning and requirements. Recital 71 is tied to Article 22 
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(see ICO, 2018) and enables interpretation of Article 22(3) 
(GDPR, 2018) in particular: “In the cases referred to in 
points (a) [automated processing based on performance of a 
contract] and (c) [or consent] … the data controller shall 
implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right 
to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to 
express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.”  
 
What the “right to obtain human intervention” means or 
involves is further clarified by Recital 71, which states that 
“any form of automated processing of personal data … 
should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should 
include specific information to the data subject and the right 
to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of 
view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after 
such assessment and to challenge the decision.” So GDPR 
clearly mandates a right to an explanation with respect to 
automated decision-making, but is it as Goodman and 
Flaxman (2016) propose an explanation of an algorithm’s 
decision? In explicating the role of explanation with respect 
to AI and the law, Budish et al. (2017) note that “when we 
talk about an explanation for a decision … we generally 
mean the reasons or justifications for that particular 
outcome, rather than a description of the decision-making 
process.” The kind of explanation required by GDPR is not 
an account of how and algorithm arrived at a decision then, 
but an account that justifies that decision and which enables 
the data subject and others, including regulatory authorities 
and lawyers, to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision. 
(Selbst and Barocas, 2018). 
 
So it is not that the right to an explanation of an algorithm’s 
decision is merely limited by IP and copyright under Article 
15. It is that where the right to an explanation is explicitly 
mandated then it is not concerned to explain how an 
algorithm arrived at a decision, but rather to justify, make 
reasonable and legally defensible that decision. Misreading 
GDPR and misunderstanding the kind of explanation 
required creates what Edwards and Veale (2017) call a 
“transparency fallacy” that focuses attention, mistakenly, on 
the inner workings of the algorithmic machine. The right to 
an explanation is not concerned with those workings but 
ensuring the rights and freedoms of the data subject are 
respected and protected. In this respect Article 22 introduces 
further difficulties insofar as its requirements only apply 
when the processing of personal data has been performed 
solely by automated means and produces legal effects (e.g., 
it impacts a person’s legal status or their legal rights) or has 
consequences that significantly affect the data subject’s 
circumstances, behaviour or choices (e.g., refusal of credit). 
 
Where does that leave us then? GDPR clearly mandates a 
right to an explanation with regards to automated decision-
making. However, that right is not do with explaining an 
algorithm’s decision. Rather what is mandated requires a) 
that a general ex ante explanation of the logic, significance 
and envisaged consequences of the automated decision-
making model be provided to the data subject and b), if the 
decision-making is wholly automated, and if it produces legal 
or significant effects, that an ex post explanation justifying 
the specific decision or decisions arrived at by an algorithmic 
machine be provided to the data subject, if the data subject 
requests it and if that request does not affect the data 
controller’s rights and freedoms or the rights and freedoms of 
others who enable the controller’s processing operation (e.g., 
software providers). However, the IP/copyright carve out 
cannot be used as grounds not to provide any explanation to 
the data subject (see Recital 63 GDPR, 2018).  
 
In saying this we are aware that Selbst and Powles (2017) 
argue the ex ante / ex post distinction “falls apart” on 
analysis. However, it is important to appreciate that what falls 
apart is the particular distinction put forth by Wachter et al. 
in arguing against the right to an explanation as construed by 
Goodman and Flaxman (2016). For Wachter et al. (2017), 
GDPR only mandates ex ante explanation; the right to ex post 
explanation concerning specific decisions is “incorrectly 
attributed to Article 22(3) – which only features in Recital 
71.” The argument put forth by Wachter et al. is that the 
interpretation of GDPR offered by Goodman and Flaxman is 
therefore incorrect. Selbst and Powles (2017) agree but on 
different grounds and argue that in trivialising Recital 71, 
Wachter et al. “ignore [its] positive value”; that it is “not 
meaningless, and has a clear role in assisting interpretation 
and co-determining positive law.” A point underscored by 
the UK supervisory authority (ICO, 2018). 
 
Nonetheless, there would appear to be no general provision 
mandating the explanation, ex post, of specific decisions 
arrived at by algorithmic machines in GDPR. Ex post 
explanations – and specifically justifications of specific 
decisions arrived at by algorithmic machines – are only 
required in certain circumstances as outlined above. As 
Edwards and Veale (2017) describe it, “these certainly seem 
shaky foundations on which to build a harmonised cross EU 
right to algorithmic explanation.” Indeed, the foundations 
seem globally shaky given the territorial scope of GDPR. 
Shakier still is the idea that explanation should be furnished 
by a machine: “the protection of natural persons should be 
technologically neutral and should not depend on the 
techniques used (Recital 15 GDPR, 2018).” On the contrary, 
what is mandated, as stated in Article 22(3) and writ large in 
Recital 71 is the right for the data subject to obtain an 
explanation through “human intervention”. It is people, not 
machines, that GDPR requires an explanation from. What 
then for explainable machines?  
3. Enabling Human Intervention? 
Now it might be argued that the right to obtain an explanation 
through human intervention does not negate efforts to build 
explainable machines. As Goodman and Flaxman (2016) put 
it, “it is reasonable to suppose that any adequate explanation 
would, at a minimum, provide an account of how input 
features relate to predictions.” Indeed, we might think with 
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good reason that some account of how an algorithmic 
machine arrived at a decision would need to be incorporated 
into the occasioned provision of a justification. So there 
would seem to be great promise for those who are obliged to 
provided explanations on the particular occasions when they 
are required by GDPR, and for those who must assess the 
reasonableness of the explanations offered, in the methods of 
interpretability offered by the ML community. 
 
In a survey of methods for explaining ‘black boxes’, Guidotti 
et al. (2018) describe explanation is an “interface” between 
humans and an automated decision-maker. We take it that 
this interface is not primarily concerned with algorithmic 
transparency or understanding, as Molnar (2018) puts, “how 
the algorithm learns a model from the data and what kind 
of relationships it is capable of picking up. If you are using 
convolutional neural networks for classifying images [for 
example], you can explain that the algorithm learns edge 
detectors and filters on the lowest layers. This is an 
understanding of how the algorithm works, but not of the 
specific model that is learned in the end and not about 
how single predictions are made.” So while algorithmic 
transparency is important, it is not the principle problem. As 
Hughes (in Medsker, 2017) puts it, “while there are some 
algorithms involved, machine learning often contains a great 
deal of inference.” Algorithmic transparency is necessary but 
not sufficient, as the “inference engine” or “model” (ibid.) 
produced by the algorithm requires further explanation. 
 
Guidotti et al. (2018) identify two fundamental kinds of 
model explanation in the ML literature. One that focuses on 
global interpretability and explaining “the whole logic of a 
model and … the entire reasoning leading to all the different 
possible outcomes”, and another that focuses on local 
interpretability and explaining “only the reasons for a 
specific decision.” Thus Guidotti et al. find two different 
orders of explanation at work in the ML literature – one that 
focuses on describing how ‘black boxes’ work, and the other 
on explaining the decisions they make – and these lead to two 
fundamental approaches to explanation: “design of 
explanations” and “reverse engineering” (ibid.). The former 
involves selecting and training a machine learning model 
that is considered to be intrinsically interpretable. The 
latter, and more common approach, focuses on furnishing 
a post hoc explanation of the decision arrived by an 
algorithmic machine. 
 
Guidotti et al. go on to describe in detail a “family of 
explanation problems” and “explanator methods” found in 
the ML literature. The authors note, however, that despite the 
arsenal of methods available “in the literature, very little 
space is dedicated to a crucial aspect: the model complexity. 
The evaluation of the model complexity is generally tied to 
the model comprehensibility, and this is a very hard task to 
address (ibid.).” As Lipton (2016) reports, even the 
assumption that intrinsic approaches enable model 
comprehensibility, and thus interpretation and explanation, is 
problematic: “neither linear models, rule-based systems, nor 
decision trees are intrinsically interpretable. Sufficiently 
high-dimensional models, unwieldy rule lists, and deep 
decision trees could all be considered less transparent than 
comparatively compact neural networks.” It would appear 
that global interpretability is very difficult to achieve.  
Reverse engineering methods are not without their problems 
or dangers either. While post hoc methods may work well in 
explaining the distinction, for example, between wolves and 
huskies (Riberio et al., 2016), they may not be so effective in 
cases where models take a much larger set of features into 
account, in which case the complexity problem still applies. 
Interactive methods (e.g., Diakopoulos, 2016) are also 
potentially problematic insofar as they might placate rather 
than elucidate. As Selbst and Barocas (2018) put it, “people 
could try to make sense of variations in the observed outputs 
by favouring the simplest possible explanation that accounts 
for the limited set of examples that they generated by playing 
with the system.” So while holding initial promise, significant 
challenges confront post hoc methods in dealing with and 
conveying model complexity and comprehensibility to 
human beings, just as they confront intrinsic methods.  
 
However, more problematic for the purposes of this paper, 
the kinds of explanation offered by ML methods of 
interpretability do not segue as neatly as they might at first 
appear with the requirements of GDPR or the obligations of 
those who must meet its requirements or require information 
to satisfy them. While a globally interpretable account of a 
machine learning model may support explanation of the logic 
involved in automated decision-making, it does not account 
for the significance or consequences of it, just as a locally 
interpretable account does not justify the specific decision 
arrived at by an algorithmic machine. There are certain 
explanations that necessarily stand outside algorithmic 
decision-making and cannot be provided by methods of 
interpretability. 
 
At the root of the matter here is the recognition, as Guidotti 
et al. (2018) note, that “each community … provides a 
different meaning to explanation.” While the meaning of 
explanation is not settled in the machine learning community 
(see Lipton, 2016; Guidotti et al., 2018), it would appear to 
revolve around the notion of causality and explaining, as 
Goodman and Flaxman (2016) stress, “how input features 
relate to predictions.” Molnar (2018) goes further, “you do 
not want a human-style explanation, but rather a complete 
causal attribution [at least] you probably want a causal 
attribution when you are legally required to state all 
influencing features” or as Zoldi (2018) puts it explanation 
needs to account for “the decisioning process”, not just the 
relationship between input and output features. Now we 
appreciate that the nature and level of causal account 
required to explain automated decision-making is 
debateable and far from settled, and will turn upon what 
needs to be explained on any occasion, but our point here 
is that when ML focuses on explanation then it seeks to 
provide a causal account of some kind that articulates how 
a decision was arrived at. 
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It might also be argued that the meaning of explanation is not 
settled in law either – see the competing accounts of Wachter 
et al. (2017) and Selbst and Powles (2017) on the right to an 
explanation in GDPR for example – but it too arguably 
revolves around a core notion, not of cause but of reason. 
Thus, at the root of the misunderstanding of what GDPR 
requires are two very different orders of explanation. 
Queloz (2017) hints at the difference in the following 
example: “The rule ‘if the signal is red, then stop’, together 
with the fact that its antecedent is fulfilled, justifies the action, 
while giving the cause of [the] action would not justify it. Any 
actually performed transition from one proposition to 
another, or from thought to action, has a causal basis, a 
physiological realisation. Yet what justifies the transition is 
not that causal basis, but the normative and factual 
considerations that make the transition correct or incorrect.” 
 
What Queloz’s example makes perspicuous is that a causal 
account cannot explain a person’s decision to comply, or not, 
with the rule ‘if the signal is red, then stop’. Describing the 
influx of photons into the eye, the physiological recognition 
of the colour red or the physiological transition from thought 
to movement of muscles and the skilful physical interaction 
between body parts and machine parts (brakes, clutches, 
gears, etc.) does not explain compliance with the rule. For 
that we must appeal to “the normative and factual 
considerations that make the transition correct or incorrect” 
– i.e., that the light is red, that we routinely stop at red lights, 
it is what we do in our culture, it is part and parcel of the 
business of driving in an orderly fashion, if we don’t stop we 
may well be penalised, though emergency vehicles such as 
ambulances or fire engines or the police may go through them 
if they are on call, etc. In saying what any competent wide-
awake adult knows, it is evidently the case that we are now 
in the business of giving reasons that account for and justify 
one’s decision to stop and the decisions of others not to stop 
at the signal if it is red. Reasons justify decisions in the 
social world (Winch, 1958), not causes. 
 
GDPR seeks to make automated decision-making an 
explainable feature of the social world and thus accountable 
to data controllers, data subjects, regulators, lawyers, judges, 
law-makers, etc. This is not to say that causes have no place 
in justifying decisions; it is to say that causes cannot justify 
decisions in themselves (Raz, 2011). As Queloz (2017) puts 
it, “causes can be referred to in justifications, since a causal 
relation can hold between events even though the events are 
referred to under descriptions linking them in a justificatory 
relationship.” So, for example, cause of death by heart attack 
might be invoked to explain the failure of an aged gentleman 
to comply and to justify the no fault insurance claims of 
others affected by his tragic circumvention of the rule ‘if the 
signal is red, then stop.’ Causal accounts may be implicated 
in legal explanations, and indeed human explanations more 
generally, but they do not suffice in themselves. More is 
required and that of course is what GDPR demands, which 
rather limits the scope of machine learning methods of 
interpretability in enabling the kind of explanation required. 
The idea that machine learning methods align or can align 
with the right to an explanation mandated by GDPR is 
essentially rooted in confusions in ordinary language and the 
double use of the word ‘why’. On the one hand we routinely 
use it to ask questions about the causes of things and to 
elaborate how they came about. On the other, we routinely 
use it to inquire into persons reasons for doing things, 
including the ways they were done, and to thereby justify 
them. As Wittgenstein (1992) points out, ordinary language 
often “bewitches” us and gets us into conceptual trouble, in 
this case giving rise to the misunderstanding that a causal 
account is sufficient to deliver the kind of explanation 
required by GDPR, namely an ex ante explanation of the 
automated decision-making model and its significance and 
consequences for the data subject, and an ex post explanation 
justifying the specific decision or decisions arrived at by an 
algorithmic machine. 
4. Human-Machine Accountability 
Even if an adequate causal account can be arrived at, ML 
methods of interpretability can but play a limited role in the 
provision of a legally defensible explanation. As Selbst and 
Barocas (2018) point out, methods of interpretability “cannot 
address why decisions happen to be made that way or 
whether the decisions are justifiable.” The authors go on to 
elaborate a distinctive order of reasoning to which causal 
accounts are generally held accountable by the legal 
profession and human beings more generally, using the 
following example from the ML literature by way of 
explication. “Caruana et al. (2015) … discovered that a 
model trained to predict complications from pneumonia had 
learned to associate asthma with a reduced risk of death. To 
anyone with a passing knowledge of asthma and pneumonia, 
this result was obviously wrong.”  
 
It turns out that the model was not wrong, but it did not make 
perspicuous that asthma patients pay much closer attention to 
their breathing than non-asthma patients and thus pre-empt 
the onset of fatal respiratory disease. The problem with the 
model – like many other ML models – is that it is not 
available to intuition which, as Selbst and Barocas (2018) 
describe it, is “the bridge by which we go from explanation 
to normative assessment … in evaluating machine learning 
models … through a broad range of experiences, typically 
described as ‘common sense’.” The justification of 
automated decision-making in the social world thus turns on 
the availability of a causal account to common sense 
reasoning and with it normative assessment of the 
reasonableness of an algorithmic model’s decision. 
 
Now one might balk at the suggestion that legally defensible 
explanations are dependent upon common sense reasoning. 
However, as sociologist Harvey Sacks found during his time 
as a law student at Yale there is more to the law than statute. 
Confronted one day by a problem in case law as to whether 
or not a person on the ground was entitled to recover damages 
incurred from the overflight of his property by an airplane, it 
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was suggested that no damages could be collected if a plane 
was being piloted in a proper manner. The ensuing legal 
argument that occupied Sacks and his cohort turned on the 
definition of what was proper? “What if it were flying at 
2,000 feet? At 1,000 feet? At 250 feet? At 5 feet? Sacks 
reported that when the last of these proposal was offered, it 
was dismissed as ‘unreasonable’, as frivolous, as violating 
the canons of ‘common sense’ … he pointed out that could 
have as well have been said about the penultimate one, but 
wasn’t. What struck him then … was that ‘legal reasoning’ 
… was constrained by an infrastructure of so-called 
‘common sense’ which was entirely tacit and beyond the 
reach of argument, while controlling it” (Schegloff, 1992). 
 
The good news for the ML community, as Selbst and Barocas 
(2018) also point out, is that common sense reasoning is often 
“flawed.” As the above example regarding asthma and 
pneumonia makes perspicuous, intuition is not well equipped 
to deal with decisions that run counter to common sense, and 
this goes to the nub of the practical (if not legal) need we have 
for ‘explainable AI’. As Gunning (2018) puts in outlining 
DARPA’s XAI programme, “explainable AI – especially 
explainable machine learning – will be essential if future 
warfighters are to understand, appropriately trust, and 
effectively manage an emerging generation of artificially 
intelligent machine partners.” Of course it is not only 
‘warfighters’ who need to understand, trust, and manage 
artificially intelligent machine partners, ultimately we are all 
going to have to be able to do that, but the limitations of 
common sense reasoning surface the fundamental challenge 
confronting efforts to explain algorithmic machines: that the 
value of machine learning lies in it finding patterns that go 
well beyond human intuition.  
 
There is a double-bind at work here which underpins our 
argument as to why the right to an explanation should be 
considered harmful. On the one hand legally defensible 
explanations require that causal accounts of automated 
decision-making be made accountable to common sense 
reasoning to enable normative assessment of the 
reasonableness of, and thereby justify decisions arrived at, by 
algorithmic machines; and on the other the very virtue of ML 
increasingly lies in its complexity and consequent 
unavailability to common sense account. It is not only that 
algorithmic machines may be ‘inscrutable’, meaning as the 
UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Mark Walport (2018) puts it, 
that “we can’t know the precise structure and workings of 
algorithms that evolve continuously by a process of machine 
learning”, it is that the decisions they arrive at are also in a 
great many cases non-intuitive. 
 
We are reminded of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
elliptic remark, “If a lion could speak, we could not 
understand him”, which essentially means that lions are 
incapable of making their reasoning available to us as they 
have an entirely different “form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1992). 
Yet we co-exist and, just as with lions, then so we are going 
to have to learn to accommodate inscrutable, non-intuitive 
machines in our world. It is for this reason that we say that 
the right to an explanation should be considered harmful, as 
it blinds us to the need to consider what the accommodation 
of algorithmic machines might turn upon, how we might 
understand it, and what might be involved in enabling it. 
Instead, preoccupation with the right to an explanation 
creates unrealistic and unrealisable expectations that the ML 
community can enable it through methods of interpretability, 
and that society at large can duly expect everyday life to be 
populated by explainable machines. Both parties will be 
disappointed, and the latter may well become seriously 
disillusioned to adverse effect on the uptake of AI. 
 
To be clear, the right to an explanation mandated by GDPR 
does not require an explanation of how an algorithmic 
machine arrived at a decision. It requires a) that an ex ante 
and generic account describing the logic, significance and 
consequences of an automated decision-making model be 
provided to the data subject, and b) in certain circumstances 
when the decision-making is solely automated, that an ex post 
account providing a justification of specific decisions arrived 
at be provided by a human being (the data controller) if the 
data subject requests it. ML methods of interpretability 
cannot deliver on this as those methods trade on causal 
accounts, on explaining how an automated decision was 
made, but not why it happened to be made in the way that 
was or whether the decision itself is justifiable. These matters 
necessarily sit outside of the machine. Hence, ML methods 
of interpretability can only play a limited role in explaining 
automated decision-making.  
 
That said, algorithmic machines are increasing complex and 
commensurately inscrutable. As Knight (2017) puts it, “You 
can’t just look inside a deep neural network [for example] to 
see how it works. A network’s reasoning is embedded in the 
behaviour of thousands of simulated neurons, arranged into 
dozens or even hundreds of intricately interconnected layers. 
The neurons in the first layer each receive an input … and 
then perform a calculation before outputting a new signal. 
These outputs are fed, in a complex web, to the neurons in the 
next layer, and so on, until an overall output is produced. 
Plus, there is a process known as back-propagation that 
tweaks the calculations of individual neurons in a way that 
lets the network learn to produce a desired output.” It may 
well be, then, that obtaining a causal account is deeply 
problematic, though we note that such an account is not 
necessarily required by GDPR; what is required is 
justification of a decision arrived at by automated means. 
  
However, that too may be problematic insofar as automated 
decision-making is non-intuitive and rests on relationships 
that defy intuition and resist comprehension. So even if it is 
possible to obtain a causal account and to make the inner 
workings of the machine transparent, we may not understand 
it and not be able to understand it. The right to an explanation 
is beguiling. It seems to segue well with ML’s interests in 
interpretability, but it doesn’t. It sets up unrealisable 
expectations for the ML community – it will never be able to 
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deliver justifiable explanations, in contrast to causal 
explanations – and it sets up unrealisable expectations for 
society at large insofar as causal explanations may be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain and even if they can then 
they may simply not be intelligible to human beings. As 
Mittelstadt (2016) puts it, algorithmic machines are often 
“epistemically inaccessible.” Add to that, that it is reasons 
for, not causes of, decisions that people ordinarily seek when 
seeking explanations and the limited role of ML methods of 
interpretability in explaining automated decision-making 
seems decidedly brittle. 
 
Preoccupation with the right to an explanation diverts 
attention from the fundamental need to accommodate 
inscrutable, non-intuitive machines in everyday life. If we are 
to address and understand the challenges of accommodation, 
we need to move outside the ‘black box’ and beyond internal 
measures of accountability that focus on accuracy, 
verification, and robustness (Chen 2018). And we need to 
move beyond ethical concerns that seek to eliminate bias, 
both in training and deploying algorithmic machines, and 
ensure privacy in data processing. This is not to say that 
ethical accountabilities implicated in automated decision-
making are not important and should not be addressed, but 
that there is more to accommodating algorithmic machines in 
the social world than these machine-oriented concerns 
provide for or can provide for.  
 
An additional layer of decisions is made by those who 
develop, deploy and use algorithmic machines, which 
occasions the need for external measures of accountability. 
As Selbst and Barocas (2018) put it, “There is a set of 
explanations internal to the operation of the box itself, and a 
set of explanations about the design of the system and how 
the system will be used, that by necessity are external … 
When we seek to evaluate the justifications for decision-
making that relies on a machine learning model, we are 
really asking about the institutional and subjective process 
behind its development … Evaluating models in a 
justificatory sense means comparing the choices made by the 
developers against society’s broader normative priorities, as 
expressed in law and policy.”  
 
Understanding what is involved in justifying automated 
decision-making leads to explanations outside the black box. 
Thus Wachter et al. (2018) propose “counterfactual 
explanations” that go beyond “an attempt to convey the 
internal state or logic of an algorithm … [to] describe a 
dependency on the external facts that led to that decision”, 
e.g., that credit wasn’t given because the applicant doesn’t 
earn enough. Selbst and Barocas (2018) propose 
“algorithmic impact statements” (AIS), i.e., documents that 
explain the choices about the decision-making model, how 
data was collected, the features that were and were not 
considered, and the anticipated effects of the automated 
decision-making process. And Casey et al. (2018) note that 
the right to an explanation mandates “a general form of 
oversight” that turns upon “data auditing methodologies”, 
particularly data protection impact assessments or DPIAs 
(Article 35 GDPR, 2018; A29WP, 2018; A29WP, 2017). 
Whatever way you cut it, more is required by the right to an 
explanation than ML can deliver. 
5. The Limits of Explanation 
Whether focused on internal or external accountabilities it 
would appear that there is consensus, at least, at the current 
moment in time that machine learning can be accommodated 
in everyday life through the ethical-legal-technical or ELT 
matrix.“[The question of] whether and how algorithmic 
decision-making can be conducted in a ‘transparent’ or 
‘accountable’ way, and the scope for decisions made by an 
algorithm to be fully understood and challenged …  needs to 
be understood from an ethical, legal, and technical view.” 
(Floridi et al., 2017). We would suggest, however, that the 
social imperative of accommodating inscrutable and non-
intuitive machines in everyday life cannot be adequately 
addressed in this way. The matrix assumes that citizens are 
Rational actors, who will readily accept AI because it is 
asserted ethical and made internally and externally 
accountable in various possible ways to the law.  
 
We very much doubt that common sense reasoning will be 
quite so accommodating. One only needs to read texts such 
as Pasquale’s Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that 
Control Money and Information (2015) to feel the palpable 
mistrust that permeates public discourse around algorithmic 
machines, and recent turns in Western politics rather 
underscore the fact that Rationalism is not a driving force in 
everyday life no matter how much one might want it to be. 
There is pressing need to move beyond the ELT matrix and 
consider ML in context and what it means to live with 
inscrutable, non-intuitive machines in everyday life. We need 
to get to grips with what happens when explanations come 
to end and all we can say, to borrow from the philosopher 
Norman Malcolm (1986), is “this is what they do”.  
 
The ML literature makes it clear that what algorithmic 
machines do will not always be intelligible and explainable 
to us. There will also be problems, things will breakdown and 
go wrong; after all, no technology is infallible. 2018 brought 
with it the first death of a pedestrian, Elaine Herzberg, by an 
autonomous vehicle (Levin and Carrie, 2018). While 
investigation into this tragic incident sought to explain what 
happened and why things went wrong, and will seek do so in 
each and every case in the future, explanation is not the key 
challenge in accommodating AI. As Walport (2017) hints at, 
social acceptability is paramount, and this is not something 
we are going to determine through the ELT matrix alone. 
Rather, we need to understand the social expectations and 
concerns that ordinary people entertain about AI as seen from 
the perspective of their everyday lives, which would appear 
to have very little to do at first glance with what goes on 
inside the black box (Nilsson et al. 2018). 
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Broader societal representation is required to enable us to 
understand and address the challenges that are involved in 
“domesticating” AI (Lie and Sørensen, 1996) and making 
the technology at home in a socially organised world. The 
ELT matrix, preoccupied as it is with explainable AI, kicks 
this critical concern into the long grass. As the Royal Society 
(2017) puts it, “As these new capabilities for computer 
systems become increasingly mundane, our relationship with 
– and expectations of – the technologies at hand will evolve. 
This raises questions about the long-term effects upon – or 
expectations from – people who have grown up with machine 
learning systems and smart algorithms in near-ubiquitous 
usage from an early age.”  
 
As AI exerts increasing influence upon society we urgently 
need approaches that are capable of engaging with the 
mundane existential reality of AI here and now. While the 
preoccupation with explainability reaches beyond the ELT 
matrix (Abdul et al., 2018) alternative narratives are 
beginning to emerge in the field of Human Computer 
Interaction, where we find empirical studies of intelligent 
systems in use (e.g., Porcheron et al., 2018), and design 
approaches that seek to elicit the acceptability challenges 
confronting the widespread adoption of future and emerging 
technologies (e.g., Lindley et al., 2017) and to enable the 
appropriation of AI into everyday life (Kuijer and Giaccardi, 
2018). Clearly a great deal more is required to get to grips 
with the social imperative of accommodation and the 
commensurate need to broaden societal representation 
than is provided by the ELT matrix, suffice to say here that 
the turn to the social in ML will turn not only on recognising 
the misdirection created by lay and professional readings of 
GDPR, but with it the limits of explanation itself. 
6. Conclusion 
That GDPR mandates a right to an explanation concerning 
automated decision-making is not disputed in this paper. 
Rather our concern has been to explicate the fundamental 
mismatch between legal and ML notions of explanation. 
While it is clear that what constitutes explanation in either 
domain is contested, the legal requirement that automated 
decision-making be justified does not equate to providing a 
causal account as to how an algorithmic model arrived at a 
decision. There is no general provision in GDPR for ex post 
explanations of specific decisions arrived at by algorithmic 
machines as these are only warranted in certain 
circumstances, and then what is mandated is that a human 
being make the decision arrived at available to normative 
assessment. Being accountable in law does not require causal 
explanation, though it may draw on causal accounts if they 
can be provided. 
 
At the heart of the debate concerning the right to an 
explanation is a fundamental misreading that has 
consequences for the machine learning community and 
society at large. The misreading creates the unrealistic and 
unrealisable expectation that what is required from the ML 
community is machines whose inner workings are intelligible 
to society, and amongst society that this is indeed what will 
be delivered. However, not only is the need for explanation 
only mandated in situations where decision-making is solely 
or wholly automated,  the kind of explanation offered by ML 
methods of interpretability can only play a limited role in 
enabling the legally defensible explanations required by 
GDPR, assuming that the problems of inscrutability and non-
intuitiveness can be dealt with and that is by no means given. 
Indeed the increasing complexity of algorithmic machines, 
which underpins their value, would seem to mitigate against 
that possibility to a significant extent in the foreseeable 
future. Even then, causal accounts will not be sufficient and 
external explanations that account for why decisions happen 
to be made in the ways that are, and whether or not they are 
reasonable, will have to provided and satisfied.  
 
Preoccupation with the right to an explanation creates the 
misleading impression that ML, in collaboration with ethics 
and law, will be able to address the social imperative of 
accommodating AI in everyday life. However, society at 
large will not accept AI solely on the basis of ethical 
assertions or legal assurances, everyday life does not work 
that way. We must face up to the fact that explanations come 
to an end and we have at some point and to some greater or 
(in due course perhaps) lesser extent to live with inscrutable 
and non-intuitive machines. Understanding how we might 
accommodate technology that defies intuition and resists 
comprehension, and the challenges that this in turn creates for 
machine learning and AI, is a critical imperative. In 
introducing this paper we drew on Lipton’s (2016) 
observation that, “as machine learning continues to exert 
influence upon society, we must be sure that we are solving 
the right problems.” We recommend that the right to an 
explanation be considered harmful then, as it misdirects us 
and diverts our attention away from solving problem of 
accommodation. Explanation does not hold the key to this. 
 
This is not to dismiss efforts within machine learning to make 
algorithmic machines more intelligible; clearly we have need 
as human beings to understand as much as we can of the 
machines that we build and their operations (but not all of us 
do and, as GDPR makes apparent, only some of us do some 
of the time). Nor is it to say that ML should pay no heed to 
the requirements of law; GDPR makes it clear that automated 
decision-making will be held accountable and ML methods 
of interpretability may support data controllers in this. It is, 
however, to recognise the limits of explanation: of what can 
be accounted for by ML methods of interpretability in the 
face of inscrutability and non-intuitiveness and what more 
needs to be taken into account than explanation provides for 
AI to find its way into our everyday lives. The social 
imperative of accommodation requires that we reach beyond 
the ELT matrix to involve new forms of societal 
representation and new narratives that enable us to shape new 
kinds of “interface” to the algorithmic machine; interfaces 
that go beyond explanation and allow us to situate AI in 
context and make it at home in our everyday lives. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384790 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council [grants EP/M001636/1, 
EP/M02315X/1]. 
References 
A29WP WP248. Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA). European Commission, 13 October, 
2017. 
A29WP WP251. Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-making and Profiling for the Purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679. European Commission, 22 August, 
2018. 
Budish, R., Bavitz, C., Doshi-Velez, F., Gershman, S., Kortz, 
M., O’Brien, D., Shieber, S., Waldo, J., Weinberger, D., 
and Wood, A. Accountability of AI Under the Law: The 
Role of Explanation. arXiv:1711.01134, 21 November, 
2017. 
Caruana, R., Lou, Y., Gehrke, J., Koch, P., Sturm, M., and 
Elhadad, N. Intelligible models for healthcare: predicting 
pneumonia risk and hospital 30-day readmission. In 
Proceedings of the 21st ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 
1721–1730, Sydney, NSW, 2015. ACM Press. 
Chen, J. The Dangers of Accuracy: Exploring the Other Side 
of the Data Quality Principle. European Data Protection 
Law Review, 4 (1): 36–52, 2018. 
Diakopoulos, N. Accountability in algorithmic decision-
making. Communications of the ACM, 59 (2): 56-62, 2016. 
Edwards, L., and Veale, M. Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 
‘right to an explanation’ is probably not the remedy you 
are looking for. Duke Law & Technology Review, 16 (1): 
18–84, 2017.  
Floridi, L, Cave, J., Davis, J., Mittelstadt, B., Raab, C., 
Wachter, S., Weller A., and Maskell, R. (2017) Written 
evidence submitted by The Alan Turing Institute 
(ALG0073). House of Commons’ Science and Technology 
Committee, 28 February, 2017.  
GDPR. Regulation 2016/679 General Data Protection 
Regulation. Official Journal of the European Union, 59: 1–
149, 2016. 
Goodman, B., and Flaxman, S. EU regulations on algorithmic 
decision-making and “a right to an explanation”. In Kim, 
B., Malioutov, M. and Varshney, K.R. (eds.), Proceedings 
of the ICML Workshop on Human Interpretability in 
Machine Learning (WHI 2016), pp. 26–30, New York 
City, NY, 2016. International Machine Learning Society. 
Guidotti, R, Monreale, A., Ruggieri, S., Turini F., Pedreschi, 
D., and Giannotti, F. A survey of methods for explaining 
black box models. ACM Computing Surveys, 51 (5): 
Article No. 93, 2018. 
Gunning, D. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). 
DARPA, 2018.  
ICO. GDPR Articles and Recitals, 2018. 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/disclosure-
log/2014536/irq0680151-disclosure.pdf 
Kuijer, L., and Giaccardi, E. (2018) Co-performance: 
conceptualising the role of artificial agency in the design 
of everyday life. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 
paper no. 125, Montreal, Canada, 2018. ACM Press. 
Knight, W. (2017) The dark secret at the heart of AI. MIT 
Technology Review, 11 April, 2017.  
Levin, S., and Carrie, J. Self-driving Uber kills Arizona 
woman in first fatal crash involving pedestrian. The 
Guardian, 19 March, 2018. 
Lie, M & Sørensen, K.H. (eds.). Making Technology Our 
Own? Domesticating Technology into Everyday Life. 
Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1996. 
Lindley, J., Coulton, P., and Sturdee, M. Implications for 
adoption. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 265–277, 
Denver, CO, 2017. ACM Press. 
Lipton, Z.C. (2016) The mythos of model interpretability. In 
Kim, B., Malioutov, M. and Varshney, K.R. (eds.), 
Proceedings of the ICML Workshop on Human 
Interpretability in Machine Learning (WHI 2016), pp. 96–
100, 2016. International Machine Learning Society. 
Malcolm, N. Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of 
his Early Thought. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1986. 
Medsker, L. Algorithms and algorithmic transparency. AI 
Matters: A Newsletter of ACM SIGAI, 2 August, 2017. 
Mittelstadt, B. Auditing for transparency in content 
personalization systems. International Journal of 
Communication, 10: pp. 4991–5002, 2016. 
Molnar, C. Interpretable Machine Learning: A Guide for 
Making Black Box Models Explainable, 2018. 
https://christophm.github.io/interpretable-ml-book. 
Nilsson, T., Crabtree, A., Fischer, J.E., Koleva, B. Breaching 
the future: understanding human challenges of 
autonomous systems for the home. Social Science 
Research Network, 10 August, 2018.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384790 
 
 
 
Pasquale, F. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms 
that Control Money and Information. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2015. 
Porcheron, M., Fischer, J.E., Reeves, S., and Sharples, S. 
Voice interfaces in everyday life. In Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems, paper no. 640, Montreal, Canada, 2018. ACM 
Press. 
Raz, J. Reasons: Explanatory and Normative. From 
Normativity to Responsibility (ed. Raz, J.), pp. 13–35. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2011. 
Ribeiro, M.T., Singh, S., and Guestrin, C. “Why should I trust 
you?” Explaining the predictions of any classifier. In 
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 
pp. 1135–1144, San Francisco, CA, 2016. 
Royal Society. Machine Learning: The Power and Promise 
of Computers that Learn by Example, April 2017. 
Selbst, A.D., and Barocas, S. The intuitive appeal of 
explainable machines. Fordham Law Review, 87 (3): 
1085–1139, 2018. 
Selbst, A.D., and Powles, J. Meaningful information and the 
right to an explanation. International Data Privacy Law, 7 
(4): 233–242, 2017. 
Shegloff, E.A. Introduction by Emanuel A. Schegloff. 
Harvey Sacks Lectures on Conversation, Volume I (ed. 
Jefferson, G.), pp. ix–lxii. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 
MA, 1992. 
Queloz, M. Two orders of things: Wittgenstein on reasons 
and causes. Philosophy, 92 (3): 369–397, 2017. 
Urquhart, L., Lodge, T., and Crabtree, A. Demonstrably 
doing accountability in the Internet of Things. 
arXiv:1801.07168, 22 January, 2018. 
Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., and Floridi, L. Why a right to 
explanation of automated decision-making does not exist 
in the General Data Protection Regulation. International 
Data Privacy Law, 7 (2): 76–99, 2017. 
Walport, M. The rise of machines: are algorithms sprawling 
out of our control? Wired, 1 April, 2017. 
Winch, P. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, Great Britain, 1958. 
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1992. 
Zoldi, S. How and why AI will evolve in 2018. Compare the 
Cloud, 9 January, 2018.  
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384790 
